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Abstract
The paper proves that in two-player logit form symmetric contests with concave success function, commitment to a 
particular strategy does not increase a player's payoff, while in contests with more than two players it does. The paper 
also provides a contest-like game in which commitment does not increase a player''s payoff for any number of players.
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1. Introduction
It has been noted that in two-player symmetric contests, local commitment to an action
does not increase a player’s payoff (Dixit 1987), while in contests with more than two
players it does. However, a proof of the global result for general contests has not been
provided (Kra¨kel 2002, has a proof of a related result for linear success function).
The local result is based on the slope of the opponent’s reaction function being zero at
the symmetric equilibrium, thus being equal to the slope of the level curve of a player’s
payoff function. This is a necessary condition for the result but is not sufficient. A
comment on Dixit’s paper by Baye and Shin (1999) discusses an example of a contest
game where the result does not hold.
This paper proves that when the contest probability of winning has the logit form
with concave success function, then the result holds globally, i.e. a player’s payoff is not
increased from commitment to any strategy, not necessarily close to equilibrium.
Two-player contests may appear special as the result does not extend to contests
with more than two players. I present a game in which the result holds for any number
of players. The game is a modification of the usual contest game in which each player
participates in a contest against the average effort of other players.
2. Two-player logit contests
Consider two-player symmetric contests in which Players 1 and 2 simultaneously choose
an effort or investment levels xi ∈ [0,∞), i = 1, 2. The payoffs are
u1(x1, x2) =
f(x1)
f(x1) + f(x2)
V − x1, (1)
where V > 0 is the value of the prize, f(x) ≥ 0 when x = 0, f ′(x) > 0 for all x, f ′′(x) ≤ 0
for all x, and u2(x1, x2) = u1(x2, x1).
The first order conditions for Nash equilibrium are
∂u1
∂x1
=
f ′(x1)f(x2)
(f(x1) + f(x2))2
V − 1 = 0, (2)
∂u2
∂x2
=
f ′(x2)f(x1)
(f(x1) + f(x2))2
V − 1 = 0. (3)
For all interior x1, x2, the second order conditions ∂
2ui/∂x
2
i = f(xj)(f
′′(xi)(f(xi) +
f(xj))−2(f ′(xi))2)V/(f(xi)+f(xj))3 < 0 are satisfied. Therefore the first order conditions
define the reaction functions of the players.
The first order conditions are f ′(x∗)V/(4f(x∗)) − 1 = 0 at a symmetric equilibrium
x1 = x2 = x
∗. If limx→0 f ′(x)V/(4f(x)) > 1 and limx→∞ f ′(x)V/(4f(x)) < 1, then there
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is unique interior symmetric equilibrium. The conditions are satisfied for example by
function f(x) = xr for r ≤ 1.
The second cross-derivative of the payoff function is
∂2ui
∂xi∂xj
=
f ′(xi)f ′(xj)(f(xi)− f(xj))
(f(xi) + f(xj))3
V. (4)
From the first order conditions, the slope of the reaction function xˆi(xj) of Player i is
dxˆi/dxj = −(∂2ui/∂xi∂xj)/(∂2ui/∂x2i ). Thus
dxˆi
dxj
= − f
′(xˆi)f ′(xj)(f(xˆi)− f(xj))
f(xj)(f ′′(xˆi)(f(xˆi) + f(xj))− 2(f ′(xˆi))2) . (5)
Suppose that Player 1 can commit to an action x1, observable by Player 2 who then
chooses x2. Player 1 then maximizes u1(x1, xˆ2(x1)). The first order condition for maxi-
mization is
du1
dx1
=
∂u1
∂x1
+
∂u1
∂x2
dxˆ2
dx1
= 0.
At the symmetric equilibrium x∗, ∂u1/∂x1 = 0. From (4), at this equilibrium
dxˆ2/dx1 = 0. Therefore du1/dx1 = 0 at x1 = x
∗. The necessary condition for maxi-
mization is satisfied at the simultaneous move game equilibrium x∗. This is the result
noted by Dixit (1987). However, whether x1 = x
∗ is indeed a global maximum is left open,
although Dixit notes that this depends on the curvatures of the best response function
and of level contours.
The second order condition for maximization is
d2u1
dx21
=
∂2u1
∂x21
+
∂2u1
∂x2∂x1
dxˆ2
dx1
+
(
∂2u1
∂x1∂x2
+
∂2u1
∂x22
dxˆ2
dx1
)
dxˆ2
dx1
+
∂u1
∂x2
d2xˆ2
dx21
< 0.
At symmetric equilibrium dxˆ2/dx1 = 0, thus ∂
2u1/∂x
2
1 + ∂u1/∂x2 · d2xˆ2/dx21 < 0. From
(5), d2xˆ2/dx
2
1 = (f
′(x∗))3/(2f(x∗)(f ′′(x∗)f(x∗) − (f ′(x∗))2)) because d(dxˆ2/dx1)/dx1 =
∂(dxˆ2/dx1)/∂x1 at equilibrium. Since ∂u1/∂x2 = −f(x1)f ′(x2)/(f(x1) + f(x2))2, at x∗
d2u1
dx21
=
f ′′(x∗)f(x∗)− (f ′(x∗))2
4(f(x∗))2
V − f
′(x∗)
4f(x∗)
V
(f ′(x∗))3
2f(x∗)(f ′′(x∗)f(x∗)− (f ′(x∗))2) .
From the first order conditions, at equilibrium f ′(x∗)V = 4f(x∗). Then
d2u1
dx21
=
2(f ′′(x∗)V − 16f(x∗))2 − 162f(x∗)2
8(f ′′(x∗)f(x∗)− (f ′(x∗))2) .
The minimum of the numerator is achieved when f ′′ = 0. Then the expression is positive,
thus the numerator is positive for all x∗. Thus d2u1/dx21 < 0 at equilibrium. Therefore
locally the second order condition for a maximum is satisfied. This can also be checked
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by using the condition in Baye and Shin (1999) on the derivatives of the contest winning
probability function.
To prove that x1 = x
∗ is a global maximum, consider the following. The level curve
of Player 1 passing through the equilibrium x∗ is
f(x1)
f(x1) + f(x2)
V − x1 = 1
2
V − x∗. (6)
The reaction function of Player 2 is given by (3). If one can show that the level curve
and the reaction function have only x∗ in common, then the local second order condition
is sufficient for a global maximum.
From the level curve, f(x1) + f(x2) = f(x1)V/(V/2− (x∗ − x1)), or
f(x2) = f(x1)
V/2 + (x∗ − x1)
V/2− (x∗ − x1) . (7)
Substituted into the reaction function, f(x1)f
′(x2)V = (f(x1)V/(V/2− (x∗ − x1)))2, or
f ′(x2) = f(x1)
V
(V/2− (x∗ − x1))2 . (8)
The derivative of the right-hand side of (8) w.r.t. x1 is V (f
′(x1)(V/2 − (x∗ − x1)) −
2f(x1))/(V/2− (x∗− x1))3. Since V/2− (x∗− x1) > 0, the denominator is positive. The
derivative of the numerator w.r.t. x1 is f
′′(x1)(V/2 − (x∗ − x1)) − f ′(x1) < 0. Since
the numerator is zero when x1 = x
∗ and is decreasing, f(x1)V (1/(V/2 − (x∗ − x1)))2 is
decreasing when x1 > x
∗ and increasing when x1 < x∗.
The derivative of the right-hand side of (7) w.r.t. x1 is (f
′(x1)(V 2/4− (x∗ − x1)2)−
V f(x1))/(V/2 − (x∗ − x1))2. The derivative of the numerator is f ′′(x1)(V 2/4 − (x∗ −
x1)
2) + f ′(x1)(2(x∗ − x1) − V ). From (6), |x∗ − x1| < V/2 for positive x1, x2. Therefore
the derivative of the numerator is negative. Since the numerator is zero when x1 = x
∗,
the same conclusion as in the previous paragraph follows: f(x1)(V/2 + (x
∗−x1))/(V/2−
(x∗ − x1)) is decreasing when x1 > x∗ and increasing when x1 < x∗.
Consider x1 < x
∗. Since the right-hand side of equation (7) is increasing, f(x1)(V/2+
(x∗−x1))/(V/2− (x∗−x1)) < f(x∗). Then the x2 that satisfies (7) is less than x∗. Then
f ′(x2) ≥ f ′(x∗) = 4f(x∗)/V . Since the right-hand side of equation (8) is also increasing,
f(x1)V (1/(V/2− (x∗− x1)))2 < 4f(x∗)/V . Thus (8) is not satisfied. A similar reasoning
shows that the two equations cannot be satisfied for x1 > x
∗. Therefore x1 = x2 = x∗ is
the unique point that satisfies the two equations.
Since the local second order conditions are satisfied for x1 = x2 = x
∗ and this is
the only point that the level curve passing through it has in common with the reaction
function of Player 2, other points on the reaction function give lower payoff to Player 1.
Thus
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Theorem 1 Suppose that in two-player symmetric contests with payoff function (1),
where the contest success function satisfies f(0) ≥ 0, f ′(x) > 0, f ′′(x) ≤ 0 for all x > 0,
there exists a simultaneous move interior symmetric equilibrium x∗. Then the subgame
perfect equilibrium outcome when Player 1 can commit to an observable action before
Player 2 is x1 = x2 = x
∗.
The equality of the slopes of the reaction function and of the level curve at the
simultaneous move equilibrium is necessary but not sufficient. Baye and Shin (1999)
discuss contest games where a player gains because the local second order condition does
not hold. They show that among such games are logit form contests with f(x) = xr for
r ∈ (√2, 2].
3. Contests with more than two players
A symmetric n-player contest with the logit form probability of winning the prize has
payoff functions
ui(x1, . . . , xn) =
f(xi)∑n
j=1 f(xj)
V − xi, (9)
with the same assumptions on f(x) as in the previous section, f(0) ≥ 0, f ′(x) > 0,
f ′′(x) ≤ 0 for all x > 0.
The derivatives of the payoff function are:
∂ui
∂xi
=
f ′(xi)
∑
k 6=i f(xk)
(
∑n
k=1 f(xk))
2 V − 1,
∂ui
∂xj
=
−f(xi)f ′(xj)
(
∑n
k=1 f(xk))
2V,
∂2ui
∂x2i
=
(f ′′(xi)
∑n
k=1 f(xk)− 2(f ′(xi))2)
∑
k 6=i f(xk)
(
∑n
k=1 f(xk))
3 V,
∂2ui
∂xi∂xj
=
f ′(xi)f ′(xj)(f(xi)−
∑
k 6=i f(xk))
(
∑n
k=1 f(xk))
3 V.
Since ∂2ui/∂x
2
i < 0 for all interior points, at an interior symmetric equilibrium (x
∗, . . . , x∗)
∂ui/∂xi = (n−1)f ′(x∗)/n2f(x∗) ·V −1 = 0. Such an equilibrium exists when limx→0(n−
1)f ′(x)V/(n2f(x)) > 1 and limx→∞(n − 1)f ′(x)V/(n2f(x)) < 1. These conditions are
satisfied e.g. by f(x) = xr for r ≤ 1.
Suppose that Player 1 can commit to an action x1, observable by all other players
who then choose their actions simultaneously. The first order condition for maximization
of u1(x1, xˆ2(x1), . . . , xˆn(x1)) is
du1
dx1
=
∂u1
∂x1
+
∂u1
∂x2
dxˆ2
dx1
+ . . . +
∂u1
∂xn
dxˆn
dx1
.
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Equilibrium reaction functions xˆi(x1) are given implicitly by the first order conditions
∂ui/∂xi(x1, . . . , xn) = 0, i = 2, . . . , n. Differentiating each of them w.r.t. x1 gives
∂2ui
∂x1∂xi
+
∂2ui
∂x2∂xi
dxˆ2
dx1
+ . . . +
∂2ui
∂xn∂xi
dxˆn
dx1
= 0, i = 2, . . . , n.
At symmetric equilibrium ∂2ui/∂x
2
i = (n−1)(nf ′′(x∗)f(x∗)−2(f ′(x∗))2)V/(n3f(x∗)2)
for all i and ∂2ui/∂xj∂xi = (2−n)(f ′(x∗))2V/(n3f(x∗)2) for all i, j 6= i. Summing up the
n− 1 equations in the above display gives
(n− 1) ∂
2ui
∂xj∂xi
+
(
∂2ui
∂x2i
+ (n− 2) ∂
2ui
∂xj∂xi
)(
dxˆ2
dx1
+ . . . +
dxˆn
dx1
)
= 0. (10)
Since at equilibrium ∂u1/∂xi = −f ′(x∗)V/(n2f(x∗)) 6= 0 for all i 6= 1, and ∂u1/∂x1 = 0,
the first order condition for maximization becomes du1/dx1 = ∂u1/∂xi · (dxˆ2/dx1 + . . .+
dxˆn/dx1) = 0. However, from (10) dxˆ2/dx1 + . . . + dxˆn/dx1 6= 0 for n > 2, since
∂2ui/∂xj∂xi 6= 0 then. Therefore
Proposition 1 In symmetric n-player contests with payoff function (9), the subgame
perfect equilibrium outcome when one player can commit to an observable action before
other players is different from the simultaneous move equilibrium x∗ when n > 2.
The result is a particular case of a result in Dixit (1987) where asymmetric contests are
also allowed. The result depends on whether ∂2ui/∂xj∂xi = 0 as this determines whether
dxˆi/dx1 = 0.
Contests appear to have a difference between cases n = 2 and n > 2. However, the
payoff functions can be modified to construct games in which commitment does not give
an advantage for other values of n or indeed for any value of n. Consider the payoff
function
ui(x1, . . . , xn) =
kf(xi)
kf(xi) + m
∑
j 6=i f(xj)
V − xi.
The second cross-derivative of this payoff function is
∂2ui
∂xi∂xj
=
kmf ′(xi)f ′(xj)(kf(xi)−m
∑
j 6=i f(xj))(
kf(xi) + m
∑
j 6=i f(xj)
)3 V
and at symmetric equilibrium x∗
∂2u1
∂xi∂xj
=
km(f ′(x∗))2(k −m(n− 1))
(k + m(n− 1))3f(x∗)2 V.
This expression is zero when k = m(n − 1). For various values of n, one can construct
games so that the necessary condition for maximization of u1(x1, xˆ2(x1), . . . , xˆn(x1)) is
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satisfied. For example, when n = 3, then m = 1/2 and k = 1 gives a game for which it
is satisfied.
Taking m = 1 and k = n− 1 gives a game in which the slope of the reaction function
is zero at symmetric equilibrium for all n. Rewriting this game’s payoff function as
ui(x1, . . . , xn) =
f(xi)
f(xi) +
1
n−1
∑
j 6=i f(xj)
V − xi (11)
gives an interpretation that each player engages in a contest with a potentially variable
total prize against the average effort of other players. For this game, independently of n,
commitment may have no advantage.
To show that there is a game in which the possibility of commitment by Player 1 gives
no advantage for any n, consider the case f(x) = x. The symmetric interior equilibrium
for this game is found from the first order conditions
1
n−1
∑
j 6=i xj
(xi +
1
n−1
∑
j 6=i xj)
2
V − 1 = 0.
When xi = xj = x
∗ for all i, j, then x∗ = V/4.
From the first order condition of Player i, (x1 +
∑
j 6=i xˆj)V/(n − 1) = (xˆi + (x1 +∑
j 6=i xˆj)/(n − 1))2. Subtracting the first order condition for Player j from the one of
Player i gives (xˆj − xˆi)V/n = (xˆj − xˆi)(1/(n − 1) − 1)(1 + 1/(n − 1)(xˆi + xˆj) + 2/(n −
1)(x1 +
∑
k 6=i,j xˆk)). If xˆj 6= xˆi, then xˆj− xˆi can be cancelled from the two sides. But then
the left-hand side is positive while the right-hand side is negative. Therefore xˆj = xˆi at
an interior equilibrium.
When xˆi = xˆ for all i 6= 1, the level curve of Player 1 through equilibrium xi = x∗ is
x1
x1 + xˆ
− x1 = V
4
(12)
and xˆ satisfies the first order condition for Players i, i 6= 1
1
n−1(x1 + (n− 2)xˆ)
(xˆ + 1
n−1(x1 + (n− 2)xˆ))2
V − 1 = 0. (13)
The first order condition can be rewritten as F (x1, xˆ) = (n− 1)(x1 + (n− 2)xˆ)V − ((2n−
3)xˆ + x1)
2 = 0. Substituting xˆ from the level curve, simplifying and factorizing the
expression gives (4x1−V )2(x1(4n2−4n+4)+V (8n−3n2−5)) = 0. The last parenthesis
is zero when x1 = V (3n
2 − 8n + 5)/(4n2 − 4n + 4). The right-hand side is larger than
V/4 for n > 1 and then xˆ < 0 from the level curve. Thus the only points satisfying both
equations (12) and (13) with both x1, xˆ positive is x1 = xˆ = V/4.
Player 1 maximizes u1(x1, xˆ(x1), . . . , xˆ(x1)). The local second order condition for
maximum is d2u1/dx
2
1 < 0. At equilibrium d
2u1/dx
2
1 = ∂
2u1/∂x
2
1+(n−1)∂u1/∂xˆ·d2xˆ/dx21.
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From the reaction function of the other players, dxˆ/dx1 = −(∂F/∂x1)/(∂F/∂xˆ) and
at equilibrium ∂F/∂x1 = 0. Then d
2xˆ/dx21 = −(∂2F/∂x21)/(∂F/∂xˆ). Evaluating the
derivatives at x1 = xˆ = V/4 gives d
2u1/dx
2
1 = (−4(n− 1) + 2)/(V (n− 1)) < 0 for n > 1.
Since the local second order condition is satisfied and the reaction function of Players
i, i 6= 1 has only the symmetric equilibrium point x1 = x∗ = V/4 in common with the
level curve of Player 1, choosing x1 different from V/4 cannot give Player 1 higher payoff.
Proposition 2 In the game with payoff function (11) with f(x) = x, the outcome of
the subgame perfect equilibrium when Player 1 can commit to an observable action is the
same as the outcome in the equilibrium x∗ = V/4 of simultaneous move game for any n.
4. Conclusion
This paper proves that in two-player logit form symmetric contests with concave success
functions, the possibility of commitment does not benefit the player who can commit.
In strategic situations the necessary condition for this is that at equilibrium the reaction
function of the other player has the same slope as the player’s payoff level curve. This
condition is not sufficient but in the contests analyzed, commitment indeed does not lead
to a higher payoff.
In n-player symmetric contests with n > 2 commitment is always advantageous.
Modifying the payoff function to represent the game as a contest against the average
effort of other players leads to a game where commitment does not work for any n.
Commitment may have several interpretations. For example, delegation (e.g. Vickers
1985) or indirect evolution of preferences (Gu¨th and Yaari 1992) use commitment. In
those cases the committed player has a different reaction function and therefore the
outcome shifts along the reaction function of the opponent. The results of this paper
and of Possajennikov (2008) imply that in games where commitment to an action does
not increase a player’s payoff, preferences coinciding with material payoffs are stable, or
delegates are provided with incentives to maximize principal’s payoff. Two-player contests
and contests against the average effort of other players are examples of such games.
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